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1 Introduction
Policymakers have expressed skepticism when reviewing airlinesapplication to form a codeshare
alliance in the event that such an alliance involves potential partners that have signicant overlap
in their route networks. The heart of the concern is that these potential partners are direct
competitors in the segments of their networks that overlap, and an alliance between them, which
often requires broad discussions between partners to make their interline1 service seamless, could
facilitate collusion on prices and/or service levels in the partnersoverlapping markets. Before
ultimately approving the Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance, which was formed in June 2003,
the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) expressed these concerns.2 The DOTs review of
this proposed alliance points out that the three airlinesservice overlap in 3,214 markets accounting
for approximately 58 million annual passengers, which is in contrast to the next largest alliance
between United Airlines and US Airways with overlapping service in only 543 markets accounting
for 15.1 million annual passengers. So unlike much of the literature that focuses on international
airline alliances [Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2011); Brueckner and Proost (2010); Brueckner (2003);
Brueckner and Whalen (2000); Bilotkach (2007); Lederman (2007) among others], we focus on a
U.S. domestic alliance [Ito and Lee (2007); Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004); Gayle (2008)].
Using a reduced-form econometric model similar to that in Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann
(2004), Gayle (2008) has shed some light on price e¤ects associated with the Delta/Continental/Northwest
codeshare alliance. In particular, Gayle (2008) nds that the alliance is associated with a marginal
price increase, which by itself points to possible collusive e¤ects. But a marginal price increase
is also consistent with increased demand and there is good reason to believe that an alliance has
a demand-increasing e¤ect associated with it. For example, passengers that are members of an
airlines frequent-yer program may cumulatively earn and redeem frequent-yer miles across any
partner in the alliance. The new opportunities for passengers to earn and redeem miles will likely
increase demand for the alliance partnersproducts. In the case of enhancements to international
frequent-yer partnerships, Lederman (2007) provides reduced-form econometric evidence suggest-
ing that enhancements to international frequent-yer partnerships are associated with increases in
domestic airline demand.
1 Interline means that at some point in the trip when passengers change planes they also change airlines.
2See Termination of review under 49U.S.C. § 41720 of Delta/Northwest/Continental Agreements,published by
O¢ ce of the Secretary, Department of Transportation, January 2003.
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To better understand the market e¤ects associated with an alliance, both from the demand and
supply sides of a market, it is important to go beyond the reduced-form analyses that currently exist
in the literature. As such, the main contribution of our present paper is to specify and estimate a
structural econometric model that allows us to disentangle demand changes from possible changes in
airline pricing behavior that are associated with a codeshare alliance. The empirical separation of
demand changes from airline pricing behavior changes allows us to: (1) statistically test whether a
codeshare alliance is associated with a demand-increasing e¤ect; and (2) statistically test whether a
codeshare alliance is associated with collusive pricing behavior in the partnersoverlapping markets,
as feared by policymakers.
Our key ndings are as follows: First, the econometric estimates for the air travel demand
equation suggest that the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance has a demand-increasing
e¤ect associated with it. Importantly, the demand-increasing e¤ect is only evident in markets that
the partners have a substantial joint passenger share (greater than 49%) prior to implementation of
the alliance. Since a relatively larger proportion of passengers in a market are more likely to have
frequent-yer membership with at least one of the three carriers in markets that the carriers jointly
dominate prior to the alliance, this nding is consistent with the argument that these frequent-yer
passengers will increase their demand for the alliance partnersproducts given that the alliance
creates new opportunities for passengers to accumulate and redeem frequent-yer points across
partner carriers.
Second, a statistical non-nested test applied to air travel supply model selection suggests that
Bertrand Nash pricing behavior, rather than collusive pricing behavior, between the three airlines
better t the data in markets where the three airlines codeshare together. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the rst paper to explicitly test and statistically reject that collusive pricing
behavior is associated with a codeshare alliance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we make some key denitions
which build the foundation for important issues we subsequently model, analyze, and discuss. In
section 3 we discuss characteristics of our data. We present the structural econometric model in
section 4, while estimation strategy is discussed in section 5. Results are presented and discussed
in section 6. Concluding remarks are o¤ered in section 7.
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2 Denitions
A market is dened as directional round-trip air travel between an origin and a destination airport
during a particular period. The assumption that markets are directional implies that a round-
trip air travel from Atlanta to Detroit is a distinct market than round-trip air travel from Detroit
to Atlanta. Furthermore, this directional assumption allows for the possibility that origin city
characteristics may inuence market demand [see Gayle (2007a, 2007b, 2013), Berry, Carnall and
Spiller (2006)].
A ight itinerary is dened as a specic sequence of airport stops in traveling from the origin to
destination airport. An air travel product is dened as a unique combination of airline(s) and ight
itinerary. Following Ito and Lee (2007), a pure online product means that the same airline markets
and operates all segments of a round-trip. For example, three separate pure online products are:
(1) a non-stop round-trip from Atlanta to Detroit marketed and operated by Delta Air Lines;
(2) a round-trip from Atlanta to Detroit with one stop in Minneapolis marketed and operated by
Delta Air Lines; and (3) a non-stop round-trip from Atlanta to Detroit marketed and operated by
Northwest Air Lines. Note that all three products are in the same market - Atlanta to Detroit.
A codeshare agreement e¤ectively allows one carrier (called the "ticketing carrier" or "marketing
carrier") to sell seats on its partnersplane as if these seats are owned by the carrier selling the
seats. The carrier whose plane that actually transports the passenger is referred to as the "operating
carrier". For example, Northwest may sell tickets for a subset of seats on a Delta operated ight
between Atlanta and Detroit as if the plane were owned by Northwest. Thus, a passenger that
uses a codeshare itinerary may have bought the round-trip ticket from Northwest, but actually ies
on a plane operated by Delta.
The literature on domestic airline alliances has identied two main types of codeshare itineraries:
(1) traditional codeshare; and (2) virtual codeshare.3 Traditional codeshare itineraries combine
interline operating services of partner carriers on a given route, where one of these operating carriers
is the sole ticketing carrier for the entire trip. An example of a traditional codeshare product is
a trip from Atlanta to Detroit with one stop in Minneapolis, where the Atlanta to Minneapolis
segment of the trip is operated by Delta, the Minneapolis to Detroit segment of the trip is operated
by Northwest, but the ticket for the entire trip is marketed by Northwest. Brueckner and Whalen
3See Ito and Lee (2007) and Gayle (2008) for discussions of the main types of codeshare products in the U.S.
domestic market.
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(2000), Brueckner (2003), Ito and Lee (2007) and Gayle (2008) nd evidence that traditional
codesharing tends to lower rather than raise prices. An often cited reason for this price-decreasing
e¤ect of traditional codesharing is that this type of codesharing eliminates double markup that
would otherwise persist when carriers are una¢ liated.4
Owing to the existing robust empirical evidence of a price-decreasing e¤ect associated with
traditional codesharing, this type of codesharing is not the focus of our present analysis. The
type of codesharing we focus on in this research is referred to as virtual codeshare. A passenger
using a virtual codeshare itinerary remains on a single operating carriers plane(s) for the entire
round-trip, but the ticket for the trip was marketed and sold by a partner ticketing carrier. Thus
a key distinction between virtual codeshare and traditional codeshare is that traditional codeshare
requires the passenger to travel on di¤erent operating carriersplanes (interline air travel) on a
multi-segment route, while virtual codeshare does not involve interline air travel even when the
passenger changes planes on a multi-segment route. We focus on virtual codesharing because
Gayle (2008) nds that this is the only type of codesharing that is associated with price increases.
Figure 1 gives an example where two airlines route networks overlap and the airlines may
virtual codeshare together in the origin-destination market. The gure shows that Northwest and
Delta both operate non-stop ights in the Atlanta to Detroit market. If they virtual codeshare
together in this market, then a subset of the passengers on the Delta plane would have bought
their tickets from Northwest, while a subset of the passengers on the Northwest plane would have
bought their tickets from Delta.
4See Gayle (2013) for an empirical investigation of situations in which double markup may persist for traditional
codeshare products. Chen and Gayle (2007) provides an analogous theoretical analysis of this issue.
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Atlanta
Detroit
Northwest plane
with some Delta-
ticketed passengers.
Figure 1: Route Network Diagram
Delta plane with
some Northwest-
ticketed passengers.
Figure 2 shows an alternate situation in which the airlinesroute networks may overlap. In
Figure 2, Northwest operates a non-stop ight in the Atlanta to Detroit market, while Delta
operates a one-stop itinerary in the Atlanta to Detroit market, but unlike Figure 1, Delta does
not operate a non-stop ight in this market. Northwest and Deltas networks are still considered
to be overlapping in Figure 2 even though Delta operates only a one-stop itinerary while Northwest
operates a non-stop itinerary. Both carriers may virtual codeshare together in Figure 2.
Minneapolis
Atlanta
Detroit
Delta plane with some
Northwest-ticketed
passengers that are
destined for Detroit.
Northwest plane
with some Delta-
ticketed passengers.
Figure 2: Modified Route Network Diagram
Delta plane with
some Northwest-
ticketed passengers.
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In Figure 2 it might seem counter-intuitive that a passenger would choose a one-stop itinerary
even though a non-stop ight between the origin and destination is available. However, passengers
often choose less convenient routes (ight itineraries that require intermediate stops) to get from
their origin to destination when such alternate routing is competitively priced. In other words,
within reasonable bounds, some passengers are willing to trade-o¤ travel itinerary convenience for
a lower price.
Figure 2 can also be used to illustrate a situation in which virtual codesharing is likely to have
a demand-increasing e¤ect associated with it. In the event that Northwest and Delta do not have
a codeshare alliance, Northwest can only o¤er its Atlanta-based customers (some of whom may be
members of Northwests frequent-yer program) a non-stop ight to Detroit. However, an alliance
with Delta allows Northwest to o¤er its Atlanta-based customers both a non-stop ight on its own
plane and a one-stop virtual codeshared itinerary operated solely by Delta. While passengers in
Atlanta already had the option, prior to an alliance, to purchase either a pure online one-stop
itinerary from Delta or a pure online non-stop ight from Northwest, Northwests frequent-yers
could not accumulate frequent-yer miles on the Delta operated ights. Thus, the alliance created
a new opportunity for Northwest frequent-yers to accumulate miles on a Delta operated one-stop
itinerary. Similarly, Delta frequent-yers that would like to travel on the non-stop Northwest ight
also have a new opportunity to accumulate frequent-yer miles on the Northwest operated ight.
The new opportunity for passengers to accumulate frequent-yer miles across partner carriers is
one reason we expect a demand-increasing e¤ect to be associated with a codeshare alliance. Our
econometric model is designed to isolate and test for this potential demand-increasing e¤ect.
Figure 2 is also useful to illustrate the main concern the DOT expressed in its review of the
proposed alliance between Delta, Continental and Northwest. Since Delta and Northwest were
competitors in the market shown in Figure 2, the DOT was concerned that forming an alliance
would reduce the amount of competition between the two airlines. The econometric model we
present below is designed to statistically test if collusive pricing behavior, rather than Bertrand
Nash pricing behavior, between the three airlines better t the data in markets that the three
airlines virtual codeshare together during the post-alliance period.
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3 Data
Data are drawn from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is a 10% random sample
of airline tickets from reporting carriers. DB1B is a database that is maintained and published
by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Among other things, the database includes: (1)
number of passengers that choose a given ight itinerary; (2) the fares of these itineraries; (3) the
specic sequence of airport stops that each itinerary uses in getting passengers from the origin to
destination city; (4) the carrier(s) that marketed and sold the travel ticket (ticketing carriers), and
the carrier(s) that passengers actually y on for their trip (operating carriers); and (5) the distance
own on each itinerary in a directional market. The distance associated with each itinerary in
a market may di¤er since each itinerary may use di¤erent connecting airports in transporting
passengers from the origin to destination city.
Unfortunately, the DB1B database does not include passenger-specic information. For exam-
ple, relevant passenger-specic information that we do not have are: (1) whether or not a passenger
has frequent-yer membership with an airline; (2) the specic day of week of the travel; (3) the
length of time in advance of travel that the passenger purchased the ticket; and (4) purpose of
trip - leisure versus business. Therefore, we will have to rely on the econometric models ability
to tease out consumer choice behavior patterns from aggregated ticket purchase data. In addi-
tion, the database does not contain certain useful measures of travel itinerary convenience such
as layover times or departure times. Notwithstanding these deciencies in the data, we are able
to construct useful measures of itinerary convenience from the available information in the data,
which we discuss below.
The data we use link each product to a directional market rather than a mere non-stop route
or segment of a market. For this research, we focus on U.S. domestic ights o¤ered and operated
by U.S. carriers in the fourth quarters of 2002 (pre-alliance) and 2003 (post-alliance).5
We arrive at the nal sample used for estimation by applying a few lters to the original data
set. First, itineraries with price less than $100 are excluded due to the high probability that
these may be coding errors or passengers redeeming frequent-yer miles to obtain a discounted
fare. Second, itineraries with an inordinate number of intermediate stops (more than two) were
dropped. Third, we focus on pure online and virtual codeshare products as dened previously.
Fourth, following the standard practice for empirical analyses of airline codesharing, we recode
5Collecting data from the same quarter in both years will eliminate potential seasonal e¤ects in demand.
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regional feeder carriers to have their major carrier codes. In the absence of such recoding of feeder
carriers, products that only include a major carrier and its associated regional feeder carrier(s) may
mistakenly be counted as codeshare products since the operating and ticketing carrier codes would
di¤er.6
Based on our previously stated research objectives, we focus on origin-destination markets in
which at least two of the three airlines (Delta, Continental and Northwest) o¤ered competing pure
online products both in the pre and post-alliance periods. In other words, the three carriers
networks overlap in all of the markets that remain in our nal sample. In addition, similar to
Berry (1992) and Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) among others, we focus on airports in the largest
50 U.S. cities as measured by city population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau. Table 1
reports a list of the cities and airports included in our sample.
6We identify codeshare products as products where the ticketing and operating carriers di¤er.
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Table 1
List of Cities and Airports
City, State Airports City, State Airports
New York City, NY LGA, JFK Boston, MA BOS
Newark, NJ EWR Louisville, KY SDF
Los Angeles, CA LAX Washington, DC DCA, IAD
Chicago, IL ORD, MDW Nashville, TN BNA
Dallas, TX DFW Las Vegas, NV LAS
Phoenix, AZ PHX Portland, OR PDX
Houston, TX IAH Oklahoma City, OK OKC
Philadelphia, PA PHL Tucson, AZ TUS
San Diego, CA SAN Albuquerque, NM ABQ
San Antonio, TX SAT New Orleans, LA MSY
San Jose, CA SJC Cleveland, OH CLE
Detroit, MI DTW Sacramento, CA SMF
Denver, CO DEN Kansas City, MO MCI
Indianapolis, IN IND Atlanta, GA ATL
Jacksonville, FL JAX Omaha, NE OMA
San Francisco, CA SFO Oakland, CA OAK
Columbus, OH CMH Tulsa, OK TUL
Austin, TX AUS Miami, FL MIA
Memphis, TN MEM Colorado Springs, CO COS
Minneapolis & St. Paul, MN MSP St. Louis, MO STL
Baltimore, MD BWI Santa Ana, CA SNA
Charlotte, NC CLT Raleigh & Durham, NC RDU
El Paso, TX ELP Pittsburg, PA PIT
Milwaukee, WI MKE Tampa, FL TPA
Seattle, WA SEA Cincinnati, OH CVG
After applying the above restrictions, we follow Gayle (2007a) and collapsed the data by aver-
aging the price and aggregating the number of passengers purchasing products as dened by unique
itinerary-airline(s) combination.7 In other words, before the data are collapsed, there are several
observations of a given itinerary-airline(s) combination that are distinguished by prices paid and
number of passengers paying each of those prices. The nal sample has 22,485 products contained
in 1,170 origin-destination markets that span the pre and post-alliance periods.
Variables that we gathered and constructed from the database include: "Price", "Hub", "Stops",
"Inconvenient", "Virtual", "Carrier Presence at Origin" and "Carrier Presence at Destination".
These variables are the observable product characteristics. "Price" is the average price paid by
7A product remains in our sample only if at least 9 passengers purchase it throughout a quarter. Berry (1992)
and Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) among others use similar, and sometimes more stringent, quantity threshold to
help eliminate idiosyncratic product o¤erings that are not part of the normal set of products o¤ered in a market.
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passengers who chose the specic itinerary-airline(s) combination. "Hub" is a zero-one dummy
variable that takes the value one if the origin airport is a hub for the ticketing carrier. "Stops" is a
variable that counts the number of intermediate stops associated with each product. For example,
in the case of products that use non-stop ight itineraries, "Stops" takes the value zero. "Incon-
venient" is the ratio of itinerary distance to the non-stop distance between origin and destination
airports. The presumption is that an itinerary is less convenient the further its "Inconvenient"
measure is from 1. "Virtual" is a zero-one dummy variable that takes the value one if the product is
virtual codeshared. Both the "Carrier Presence at Origin" and "Carrier Presence at Destination"
variables are airline-specic and vary across markets for each airline. "Carrier Presence at Origin"
measures the number of di¤erent cities that an airline has non-stop ights from going into the origin
city of the market, while "Carrier Presence at Destination" measures the number of di¤erent cities
that the airline serves using non-stop ights from the destination city of the market. We leave
discussing the rationale for using each of these variables until the results section since the main
task now is to provide descriptive information on the data.
As in Berry and Jia (2010) and Berry, Carnal and Spiller (2006), we measure a markets size
(subsequently denoted by M) by the geometric mean of population sizes across the origin and
destination cities of the market. An air travel products quantity sold (subsequently denoted by
qj) is the total number of passengers that purchase each specic itinerary-airline(s) combination.
Therefore, a products observed market share (subsequently denoted by upper case letter Sj) is
computed as quantity of the product sold divided by our measure of market size, i.e. Sj =
qj
M .
8
How we use information on each products observed market share will become clear after the
econometric model and estimation procedure are discussed.
Table 2 provides a list of the airlines in the sample according to type of products the airlines
are involved in. Table 3 reports sample summary statistics of the variables.
8We nd that our measure of market size results in product shares that are extremely small. As such, we scaled
up all product shares by a common factor. The common factor is the largest integer such that the share of the
outside good (S0 = 1  
JX
j=1
Sj) remains positive in all markets. In our data set the common factor is 42. We
perform econometric estimations with and without scaling up product shares and nd that econometric estimates are
qualitatively similar.
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Table 2
List of Airlines in the Data Set
Airlines Involved in Virtual
Codeshare Products
Airlines Involved in Pure Online
Products
Airline Name Code Airline Name Code
Alaska Airlines Inc. AS American Airlines Inc. AA
Continental Air Lines Inc. CO Alaska Airlines Inc. AS
Delta Air Lines Inc. DL JetBlue Airways B6
Northwest Airlines Inc. NW Continental Air Lines Inc. CO
United Air Lines Inc. UA Delta Air Lines Inc. DL
US Airways Inc. US Frontier Airlines F9
AirTran Airways FL
America West Airlines HP
National Airlines N7
Spirit Air Lines NK
Northwest Airlines Inc. NW
Chautauqua Airlines RP
Sun Country Airlines SY
ATA Airlines TZ
United Air Lines Inc. UA
US Airways Inc. US
Midwest Airline YX
Notes:  Note that feeder carriers such as Chautauqua Airlines are not listed as involved in
codeshare products.  This is because we assign these carriers their major carrier codes
(effectively not making a distinction between feeder and major carriers) for products where
feeder carriers operate segment(s) of the trip but the ticketing carrier is the major carrier.
However, the feeder carriers do offer pure online products, which is why they show up in the
column labeled “Airlines involved in Pure Online Products”.  In the data section of the text we
provide discussion on the rationale for assigning feeder carriers their major carrier code prior to
identifying codeshare products.
Table 3
Summary statistics of variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price ($) 218.36 67.79 101.37 856.63
HUB 0.15 0.36 0 1
Stops 0.84 0.39 0 2
Inconvenient 1.12 0.18 1 2.65
Virtual 0.031 0.17 0 1
Carrier Presence at Origin 22.91 24.28 0 130
Carrier Presence at Destination 26.53 25.59 1 143
Market Size (mean population across
the endpoint cities of a market) 901,784.90 687,820.50 264,747 5,439,591
Market nonstop flight distance (miles) 1,479.79 609.26 190 2,724
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3.1 Preliminary Descriptive Analysis
Following many event studies [for example see Borenstein (1990) and Kim and Singal (1993)], we
begin by using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to get a sense of before and after relative changes
in key variables of interest. At this point only descriptive evidence is being developed on the key
variables. A more careful analysis of the relevant issues is laid out across subsequent sections of
the paper.
In our study the relevant event is implementation of the codeshare alliance. Therefore, the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach seeks to identify e¤ects associated with implementation of the
codeshare alliance based on the extent to which variables of interest change before and after im-
plementation of the codeshare alliance across markets that should be impacted by the alliance
("treatment" markets) versus markets that should not be impacted by the alliance ("control" mar-
kets). Our treatment markets are origin-destination markets in which Delta, Continental and
Northwest codeshare together during the post-alliance period, while our control markets are origin-
destination markets that the three airlines compete in but do not codeshare together during the
post-alliance period. Among the 1,170 origin-destination markets in the data set, the three air-
lines virtual codeshare together in 852 of the markets, and therefore compete but did not virtual
codeshare together in 318 of the markets.
A variable of interest that we apply the di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to is the three airlines
average price. Specically, before and after relative change in Delta, Continental and Northwest
average price is computed by:
DCN_price = log
 
DCN_priceCodeshare_mktpost alli period
DCN_priceCodeshare_mktpre alli period
!
  log
 
DCN_priceNon Codeshare_mktpost alli period
DCN_priceNon Codeshare_mktpre alli period
!
; (1)
where subscripts post  alli  period and pre  alli  period refer to the time period used for com-
puting the variable; the superscript Codeshare_mkt refers to origin-destination markets in which
Delta, Continental and Northwest codeshare together during the post-alliance period; while super-
script Non Codeshare_mkt refers to origin-destination markets that the three airlines compete in
but do not codeshare together during the post-alliance period. Therefore,DCN_priceCodeshare_mktpre alli period
represents Delta, Continental and Northwest average price during the pre-alliance period in origin-
destination markets that they eventually codeshare together in during the post-alliance period;
DCN_priceCodeshare_mktpost alli period represents the three airlines average price during the post-alliance pe-
riod in origin-destination markets that they codeshare together during the post-alliance period;
13
DCN_priceNon Codeshare_mktpost alli period represents the three airlines average price during the post-alliance
period in origin-destination markets that they compete in but do not codeshare together during
the post-alliance period; while DCN_priceNon Codeshare_mktpre alli period represents the three airlines average
price during the pre-alliance period in origin-destination markets that they compete in but do not
codeshare together during the post-alliance period.
Analogous to equation (1), we specify before and after relative changes in the three airlines
joint passenger tra¢ c and joint passenger share as follows:
DCN_total_pass = log
 
DCN_total_passCodeshare_mktpost alli period
DCN_total_passCodeshare_mktpre alli period
!
(2)
  log
 
DCN_total_passNon Codeshare_mktpost alli period
DCN_total_passNon Codeshare_mktpre alli period
!
;
DCN_pass_share = log
 
DCN_pass_shareCodeshare_mktpost alli period
DCN_pass_shareCodeshare_mktpre alli period
!
(3)
  log
 
DCN_pass_shareNon Codeshare_mktpost alli period
DCN_pass_shareNon Codeshare_mktpre alli period
!
:
The before and after relative change in the three airlines average price, DCN_price, is
0.0179. One way to interpret this before and after relative price change is that changes in the
three airlinesaverage price leave average price 1.79% higher in their codeshare markets relative to
their non-codeshare markets. Before and after relative change in the three airlines total passenger
tra¢ c, DCN_total_pass, is -0.018. Therefore, before and after changes in the three airlines
passenger tra¢ c leave their passenger tra¢ c 1.8% lower in their codeshare markets relative to their
non-codeshare markets. The direction of the relative price and passenger tra¢ c changes suggest
that collusive e¤ects could be associated with virtual codesharing between the three airlines in their
overlapping markets.
Before and after relative change in the three airlines joint passenger share,DCN_pass_share,
is 0.019. Therefore, changes in the three airlinesjoint passenger share leave their joint passenger
share 1.9% higher in their codeshare markets relative to their non-codeshare markets. So even
though the partner airlinespassenger tra¢ c declined in their codeshare markets relative to their
non-codeshare markets, the partners end up making relative gains in passenger share in their
codeshare markets since other airlinespassengers tra¢ c fell by more in these markets. This result
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suggest that there could be a demand-increasing e¤ect associated with virtual codesharing, which
in this case resulted in increase passenger share via slower decline in passenger tra¢ c.
It must be noted that the di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis captured by equations (1), (2) and
(3), has caveats and provide only rough estimates of the e¤ects associated with virtual codeshar-
ing between the three airlines. For example, these di¤erence-in-di¤erences computations do not
control for persistent demand or cost conditions/shocks that may di¤er across codeshare versus
non-codeshare markets. In evaluating the market e¤ects associated with virtual codesharing be-
tween the three airlines, the formal econometric model presented below, while not perfect, will do
a better job at controlling for potential di¤erences in demand and cost conditions across codeshare
versus non-codeshare markets.
Last, it is also useful to get a sense of exogenous characteristics of origin-destination markets
that may inuence the three airlines choice of markets in which to virtual codeshare together
during the post-alliance period. For this descriptive analysis we rely on a reduced-form logit
regression model that uses exogenous market characteristics to explain the three alliance partners
codeshare versus non-codeshare markets. The variable being explained by the logit regression is
denoted, Codeshare_mkt, which is a zero-one indicator variable that only takes the value 1 if the
three alliance partners virtual codeshare together in the origin-destination market during the post-
alliance period. Results from this logit regression are reported in Table 4. The unit of observation
for data used in the regression is origin-destination level.
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Table 4
Reduced-form Codeshare Market Logit Regression
Dependent Variable: Codeshare_mkt = 1 if alliance partners virtual codeshare together in
origin-destination market during the post-alliance period; otherwise Codeshare_mkt = 0.
Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
Constant 0.89 1.45
Market Size (measured in 10,000,000 people) -52.41** 11.41
(Market Size)2 64.97** 21.52
Market Nonstop Flight Distance (measured in 10,000 miles) 35.85** 9.75
(Market Nonstop Flight Distance)2 -45.68 31.18
Market origin fixed effects Yes
Market destination fixed effects Yes
Pseudo R2 0.4752
Log likelihood -359.20
Number of Observations 1170
Notes:  ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.  Model is estimated with market origin dummies
and market destination dummies even though these dummy coefficients are not reported in the table.
In addition to observed market characteristics such as market size and nonstop ight distance,
the regression in Table 4 also controls for unobserved (to the researchers) market endpoint charac-
teristics using a set of dummy variables for origin xed e¤ects and destination xed e¤ects. Due
to economy of presentation purposes, the coe¢ cient estimates on these dummy variables are not
reported in the table. The coe¢ cient estimates on Market Size and (Market Size)2 suggest
that markets with mean endpoint population greater than 4,033,400 people9 are more likely to
be codeshare markets. Also, the coe¢ cient estimates on Market Nonstop F light Distance and
(Market Nonstop F light Distance)2 suggest that the probability of a market being a codeshare
market increases monotonically with nonstop ight distance between the origin and destination.
There is evidence that the regressors jointly do a good job in explaining the Codeshare_mkt
variable. For example, the Pseudo R2 of the logit regression is 0.4752, suggesting that almost 50% of
the variation in Codeshare_mkt is jointly explained by the regressors. Second, the tted values of
the dependent variable from the logit regression, i.e. Codeshare_mkt_hat =Prob(Codeshare_mkt =
1), has a 0.717 correlation with Codeshare_mkt.
9This population threshold is computed using the coe¢ cient estimates on Market Size and (Market Size)2.
Specically, the population threshold is computed by: 10; 000; 000 52:41
264:97 .
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4 The Model
We proceed by rst describing the demand-side of the model. The supply-side is then laid out,
which is where we model competitive interactions between airlines.10
4.1 Demand
In the spirit of Peters (2006), Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006), Gayle (2007a, 2007b, 2013), Gayle
and Wu (2012), Armantier and Richard (2008) and Berry and Jia (2010) among others, air travel
demand is modeled using a discrete choice framework. Specically, we use a nested logit model.11
Potential passenger i in market l during time period  faces a choice between Jl + 1 alternatives.
There are Jl+1 alternatives because we allow passengers the option (j = 0, the outside good) not
to choose either one of the Jl di¤erentiated air travel products considered in the empirical model.
Products in a market are assumed to be organized into G + 1 exhaustive mutually exclusive
groups/nests, g = 0; 1; :::; G, in which the outside good, j = 0, is assumed to be the only member
of group 0. A group or nest here refers to the set of products o¤ered by an airline within a market.
We explore alternate nesting structures in an appendix available upon request.
A passenger solves the following optimization problem:
Max
j2f0;:::;Jlg

Uij l = jl + i lg + (1  ) "ij l
	
; (4)
where Uij l is the level of utility passenger i will obtain if product j is chosen, while jl is the mean
level of utility across passengers that consume product j. jl is a function of the characteristics of
product j, which we subsequently describe. i lg is a random component of utility that is common
to all products in group g, whereas the random term "ij l is specic to product j and is assumed
to have an extreme value distribution. The parameter  lies between 0 and 1, and measures the
correlation of the consumersutility across products belonging to the same group. Since products
10Armantier and Richard (2008) also use a structural econometric model to examine a codeshare alliance. However,
a fundamental di¤erence between our model and the model in Armantier and Richard (2008) is that we model both
demand and supply aspects of codesharing, while Armantier and Richard (2008) only model the demand side. This
crucial methodological di¤erence a¤ords us the advantage of being able to separately identify demand and supply
e¤ects of codesharing, which further allows us to more meticulously examine short-run market e¤ects within a market
equilibrium framework.
11We concede that a nested logit model is not as exible and therefore less desirable compared to a random
coe¢ cients logit model. However, it is well-known that the random coe¢ cients model is more computationally
demanding to estimate relative to the nested logit model. As we discuss further in the results section, our nested
logit demand model provides elasticity estimates that are comparable to much of the literature, including papers
that use a random coe¢ cients logit specication. As such, we decide to go with the less computationally intensive
nested logit model. For checks of robustness of qualitative results we explore alternate nesting structures, as further
discussed in an appendix available upon request.
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are grouped by airlines,  can also be thought of as measuring the correlation of the consumers
utility across products o¤ered by a given airline. As  approaches 1, the correlation of preferences
among products o¤ered by the same airline within a market increases. Conversely, as  decreases,
the correlation of preferences for products o¤ered by the same airline within a market decreases.
The rationale for the product grouping structure above is to capture the possibility that passen-
gers view an airlines products as closer substitutes for each other compared to the substitutability
of these products across airlines [Gayle (2007b)]. One reason why this could be the case is that
a passenger may be heavily invested (accumulated miles own) in a given airlines frequent-yer
program and therefore, on the margin, would prefer to choose among alternate ights o¤ered by
this airline in order to build up accumulated miles towards the required threshold necessary for a
discounted trip. Second, some consumers may just have a strong brand-loyalty to a given airline
based on past experience. In any event, since  is a parameter we estimate, the data will reveal
whether or not a su¢ cient number of passengers are brand-loyal to render  > 0.
The mean level of utility obtained across the population of consumers that consume product j
is given by:
jl = xjl   pjl + ar +mktoriginl +mktdestl + 0Codeshare_mkt (5)
+1DCN  Codeshare_mkt+ 2T + 3T  Codeshare_mkt
+4T DCN + 5T DCN  Codeshare_mkt
+6T DCN  Codeshare_mktDCN_pre  alli_pass_share+ jl;
where xjl is a vector of observed product characteristics ["Stops" - the number of intermediate
stops used by an itinerary; "Inconvenient" - the ratio of itinerary distance to the market non-
stop distance; "Hub" - a zero-one dummy variable that takes the value one if the origin airport
is a hub for the carrier o¤ering the product for sale; "Virtual" - a zero-one dummy that takes
the value one if the product is virtual codeshared],  is a vector of consumer taste parameters
(marginal utilities) associated with the product characteristics in xjl, pjl is the price of product
j,  represents the marginal utility of price, ar are airline xed e¤ects, where subscript r indexes
ticketing carriers (ticketing carrier dummies), mktoriginl are market origin xed e¤ects, mkt
dest
l
are market destination xed e¤ects, Codeshare_mkt is a zero-one dummy which is equal to 1 if
a virtual codeshare product between Delta, Continental or Northwest was o¤ered in the origin-
destination market, T is a zero-one time dummy which is equal to 1 if the itinerary occurred in the
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post-alliance period, DCN is a zero-one dummy which is equal to 1 if product j is being o¤ered for
sale by either Delta, Continental or Northwest, DCN_pre   alli_pass_share is the pre-alliance
joint passenger share of Delta, Continental and Northwest in the origin-destination market, and jl
captures unobserved (by the econometricians but observed by passengers) product characteristics.
It is likely that there exists several non-price characteristics that are responsible for passengers
choice of one product over others, where these non-price characteristics are observed by passengers
and airlines but not by us the researchers given limitations of the data available. This is the
rationale for including jl in the demand model, i.e., the inclusion of jl e¤ectively acknowledges
that there will be passenger choice behavior outcomes observed in the data that cannot be fully
explained by the measured product characteristics in the data.
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are taste parameters to be estimated. 0 captures any persistent
di¤erence in mean utility for non-Delta/Continental/Northwest products across markets in which
the three airlines eventually virtual codeshare together compared to markets in which they compete
but do not codeshare together. Likewise, 1 captures any persistent di¤erence in mean utility for
the three airlinesproducts across markets in which the three carriers eventually virtual codeshare
together compared to markets in which they compete but do not codeshare together. We therefore
control for any persistent systematic di¤erence across the three airlines codeshare versus non-
codeshare markets that may a¤ect demand.
2 captures the change in mean utility over the pre and post-alliance periods for products
o¤ered by airlines other than Delta, Continental or Northwest, while 3 captures whether this
change in mean utility for other airlinesproducts di¤ers across the three airlines codeshare versus
non-codeshare markets. 4 captures the change in mean utility over the pre and post-alliance
periods for products o¤ered by Delta, Continental or Northwest, while 5 captures whether this
change in mean utility for the three airlinesproducts di¤ers across markets in which they virtual
codeshare together versus markets in which they compete but do not virtual codeshare together.
In other words, 5 > 0 implies that virtual codesharing has a demand-increasing e¤ect associated
with it, which is one of the main hypotheses we want to test. Last, 6 captures whether or not the
demand e¤ect of virtual codesharing depends on the size of the partner airlinespre-alliance joint
passenger share in a market that they eventually begin to codeshare in.
As we previously discussed, frequent-yer membership with any one of the three carriers sud-
denly becomes more valuable with implementation of the codeshare alliance, since the alliance
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allows frequent-yer members of any one of the three carriers to accumulate and redeem frequent-
yer points across any of the three partner carriers. The larger is the pre-alliance joint passenger
share of Delta, Continental and Northwest in an origin-destination market, then we should expect
a larger proportion of consumers in the market to have frequent-yer membership with at least one
of the three airlines. If this argument holds true, then we should expect 6 > 0.
The discussion above reveals that a key component of our demand specication that allows
us to identify demand e¤ects associated with the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance
(5 and 6), is that equation (5) e¤ectively compares consumerschoice behavior before and af-
ter implementation of the alliance in markets where the three airlines virtual codeshare together
("treatment" markets) versus markets in which they compete but do not virtual codeshare together
("control" markets). A reasonable criticism to raise at this point is that Codeshare_mkt in equa-
tion (5) is not strictly exogenous since airlines choose the markets in which to codeshare. The
reader will subsequently observe that we do account for the possible endogeneity of Codeshare_mkt
by replacing this variable with the estimated Pr ob(Codeshare_mkt = 1) obtained from the previ-
ously discussed logit regression in Table 4. Therefore, the logit regression in Table 4 serves as one
rst-stage reduced-form regression that is used to account for possible endogeneity when estimating
the structural demand model.
Finally, the demand for product j is given by,
dj =M  sj(x;p; ;d);
where M is a measure of market size, which we assume to be the geometric mean of population
sizes across the origin and destination cities of the market, sj () is the predicted product share
function based on the nested logit model, 12 x and p are vectors of observed non-price product
characteristics and price, respectively,  is a vector of unobserved (by the researchers) product
characteristics, and d = (; ; ; ) is the vector of demand parameters to be estimated. We
dropped the market and time subscripts (l and ) only to avoid a clutter of notation.
12The well-known formula for the predicted share function in the case of the nested logit model is: sj =
exp

j
(1 )

Dg
"
1+
GP
g=1
D
(1 )
g
# , where j is the previously discussed mean level of utility obtained from consuming product j,
Dg =
P
j2Gg
exp

j
(1 )

, and Gg is the set of products in group g.
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4.2 Supply
What is commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works is that the ticketing carrier
markets and sets the nal price for the round-trip ticket and compensates the operating carrier for
operating services provided. Details on compensation mechanisms actually used by partner airlines
are not usually made known to the public and may even vary across partnerships. Therefore, we
face the challenge of coming up with a modeling approach that captures our basic understanding
of what is commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works without imposing too much
structure on a contracting process about which we have few facts. We concede that the following
is possibly a simplistic approximation of the actual contracting used by partners to compensate
each other for services needed to provide a codeshare product.
One way to proceed, as pointed out in Chen and Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013), is to think of
a codeshare agreement as a privately negotiated pricing contract between partners (w; ), where w
is a per-passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an operating carrier for transporting the
passenger, while   represents a potential lump sum transfer between partners that determines how
the joint surplus is distributed. As we develop the supply-side of the model further, it will become
clear that only the level of w a¤ects equilibrium nal product prices. Since for the purposes of
this paper we are not concerned how the surplus is distributed between partners through the lump
sum transfer  , we do not attempt to derive an equilibrium value of  .13
Assume that the nal price of a codeshare product is determined within a sequential price-
setting game. In the rst stage of the sequential process, the operating carrier sets the price for
transporting a passenger, w, and privately makes it known to its partner ticketing carrier. In the
second stage, conditional on the agreed upon price w for services supplied by the operating carrier,
the ticketing carrier sets the nal round-trip price p for the codeshare product. The nal subgame
in this sequential price-setting game is played between ticketing carriers.
Let r = 1; :::; R index competing ticketing carriers in a market and let f = 1; :::; F index
the corresponding operating carriers. Further, let Fr be a subset of the J products, both pure
online and virtual codeshare, that are o¤ered for sale by ticketing carrier r in the origin-destination
13See Chen and Gayle (2007) for a similar theoretical modeling approach of an airline codeshare agreement.
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market.14 Carrier r solves the following prot maximization problem for each j 2 Fr:
Max
pj
X
j2Fr
(pj   zj)qj ; (6)
where qj = dj(p) in equilibrium, qj is the quantity of product j o¤ered for sale on the market,
dj(p) is market demand for product j, p represents a J  1 vector of nal prices, and zj is the
e¤ective marginal cost that ticketing carrier r incurs by o¤ering product j for sale. In the event
that product j is a codeshare product, then zj = w
f
j , where w
f
j is the price the ticketing carrier
pays to operating carrier f for its transportation services.15 On the other hand, if product j is a
pure online product, then zj = crj , where c
r
j is the marginal cost that carrier r incurs by using its
own plane(s) to provide product j. Note that in the pure online product case f = r since carrier
r is the sole ticketing and operating carrier of product j.
We posit that the marginal cost function is given by:
zj =Wj + af + j ; (7)
where Wj is a vector of variables that shift marginal cost ("Itinerary Distance", "Carrier Presence
at Origin", "Carrier Presence at Destination", market origin xed e¤ects, and market destination
xed e¤ects) and  is the associated vector of parameters, af captures operating carrier-specic
portion of marginal cost, and j is a mean-zero, random error term that captures unobserved
determinants of marginal cost. When product j is pure online, implying that zj = crj , then
equation (7) simply relates a carriers own marginal cost of providing a product to factors that
inuence this marginal cost. On the other hand, if product j is virtual codeshared, implying that
zj = w
f
j , then equation (7) is saying that w
f
j depends on factors that inuence the marginal cost of
the carrier that provides operating services for the codeshare product. This is an implication of the
assumed sequential price-setting game that determines equilibrium prices of codeshare products.
The reason is as follows. In the rst stage of the sequential price-setting game, operating carriers
each optimally choose wfj . Therefore, the equilibrium level of w
f
j in this rst stage game depends on
the marginal cost of the operating carrier that o¤ers transportation services for codeshare product
j. So, like crj , w
f
j is a function of factors that shift the marginal cost of the operating carrier. As
14For most of the subsequent equations, we intentionally omit a market subscript for variables and equations only to
avoid a notation clutter. Notwithstanding our omission of market subscripts, the reader should continue to interpret
equations in a market-specic way.
15We implicitly assume here that the ticketing carrier of a virtual codeshare product only incurs xed expenses in
marketing the product to potential passengers.
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such, the marginal cost function is e¤ectively:
Wj + af + j =
8<:
wfj if j is virtual codeshare
crj if j is pure online
(8)
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium in nal prices requires that pj of any product j o¤ered by
carrier r must satisfy the rst-order condition:
dj(p) +
X
k2Fr
(pk   zk) @dk(p)
@pj
= 0:
The rst-order conditions are a set of J equations, one for each product. A few additional denitions
allow for a more convenient representation of the rst-order conditions using matrix notation.16
First, let 
 be a J  J matrix which describes the ticketing carriersownership structure of the
J products. Let 
 (j; k) denote an element in 
, where

 (j; k) =
8<:
1 if products k and j are o¤ered by the same ticketing carrier
0 otherwise.
:
Second, let 4 be a J J matrix of rst-order derivatives of product market shares with respect
to nal prices, where element 4 (j; k) = @dk@pj . In vector notation, the system of J rst-order
conditions for the ticketing carriers can now conveniently be expressed as:
d(p) + (
:  4) (p  z) = 0; (9)
where d(), p, and z are J1 vectors of product demands, nal prices, and ticketing carrierse¤ec-
tive marginal costs, respectively, while : means element-by-element multiplication of two matrices.
Equation (9) implies the following product markups:
mkup (; ; ; ;
) = p  z =   (
:  4) 1 d(p); (10)
which reveals that product markups are a function of demand parameters and the product ownership
structure matrix.
In the event that the codeshare alliance allows Delta, Continental and Northwest to practice
collusive pricing in markets where they codeshare together during the post-alliance period, then we
can account for such collusive pricing behavior by appropriately modifying the product ownership
16See Nevo (2000) for similar notation in a merger analysis setting.
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structure matrix. In particular, let 
Collude be the modied J  J product ownership structure
matrix in which the three alliance partners are treated as a single carrier rather than distinct
carriers. Let 
Collude (j; k) denote an element in 
Collude, where

Collude (j; k) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
if distinct products k and j are o¤ered by the same ticketing carrier,
where Delta, Continental and Northwest are treated as a single carrier
0 otherwise.
:
Therefore, under collusive alliance pricing the appropriate rst-order conditions in markets
where the three airlines codeshare together during the post-alliance period are:
d(p) +


Collude:  4

(p  z) = 0; (11)
where 
 in equation (9) is replaced with 
Collude to obtain equation (11). Product markups under
collusive alliance pricing are:
mkupCollude

; ; ; ;
Collude

=  


Collude:  4
 1
d(p); (12)
4.2.1 Alternate Supply Equation Specications
At this point we do not know whether the three alliance partners practice collusive pricing, which
further implies that we do not know which product markup specication, equation (10) versus
equation (12), is most appropriate to characterize pricing behavior. If the codeshare alliance does
not allow Delta, Continental and Northwest to practice collusive pricing in the markets where
they codeshare together during the post-alliance period, then the appropriate parametric supply
equation specication, which we dene as Model h, is given by:
Model h : pj =Wjh + af + j+mkupj ; (13)
where j is the structural supply error term, and the product markup variable, mkupj , is computed
based on equation (10). On the other hand, if the codeshare alliance allows Delta, Continental
and Northwest to practice collusive pricing in markets where they codeshare together during the
post-alliance period, then the following parametric supply equation specication, which we dene
as Model g, should provide a better statistical t of the data compared to Model h:
Model g : pj =Wjg + af + j+mkup
Collude
j ; (14)
where the product markup variable, mkupColludej , is computed based on equation (12).
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We rst estimate the demand parameters, use these demand parameter estimates to compute
product markups under each alternate pricing behavior (mkupj versus mkupColludej ), then use
these product markups as variables when estimating the alternate supply equations, Model h and
Model g. Finally, in the spirit of Villas-Boas (2007), we use non-nested statistical tests based
on Vuong (1989) to see which supply specication best ts the data. Note that the estimated
markups (mkupj versus mkupColludej ) are di¤erent under each alternate pricing behavior, as such,
the competing estimated supply equations are not nested, which is why a non-nested statistical test
is needed to evaluate which supply model best ts the data.
5 Estimation
The parameters to be estimated are d = (; ; ; ) for demand and  for marginal cost. Following
Berry (1994), the estimation strategy for demand parameters involves choosing parameter values
such that observed product shares, Sj , are equal to predicted product shares, sj , that is,
Sj = sj (; ) , 8 j: (15)
As previously stated in the data section, observed product shares are computed by Sj =
qj
M . In
the case where the predicted share function, sj (), is based on the nested logit model, the above
estimation strategy yields the following well-known linear estimating equation:
ln (Sj)  ln (S0) = xj   pj +  ln
 
Sjjg

+ ar +mkt
origin +mktdest + 0Codeshare_mkt
+1DCN  Codeshare_mkt+ 2T + 3T  Codeshare_mkt (16)
+4T DCN + 5T DCN  Codeshare_mkt
+6T DCN  Codeshare_mktDCN_pre  alli_pass_share+ j ;
where S0 is the observed share of the outside option, Sjjg is the observed within group share of
product j, and j is the structural demand error term.
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Provided we have valid instruments for pj and Sjjg, equation (16) is straightforward to es-
timate using a linear instrumental variables technique such as two-stage least squares (2SLS),
which is the estimator we use. As previously discussed, we also instrument for variables associ-
ated with Codeshare_mkt using Prob(Codeshare_mkt = 1) to replace Codeshare_mkt, where
17The observed share of the outside option is computed by S0 = 1 
GP
g=1
Sg, where Sg is computed by
P
j2Gg
Sj . The
observed within group share of product j is computed by Sj=g =
Sj
Sg
.
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Prob(Codeshare_mkt = 1) is computed from a previously estimated reduced-form logit model
reported in Table 4.
Supply Model h and Model g can be re-arranged as pj  mkupj = Wjh + af + j and pj  
mkupColludej =Wjg+af+j , where pj mkupj and pj mkupColludej are e¤ectively the dependent
variables for the supply regressions respectively. Once we use the estimated demand parameters
to compute alternate product markups, mkupj and mkupColludej , the dependent variables for the
re-arranged supply equations can be constructed, and then marginal cost parameters, h and g,
can be estimated consistently using ordinary least squares.
An alternate estimation strategy would be to estimate the demand and marginal cost para-
meters jointly. However, a crucial objective of the analysis is to gure out what is the most
appropriate specication for the supply equation - Bertrand Nash versus collusive pricing by the
partner carriers. In other words, the correct specication of the supply equation is unclear a priori.
An incorrectly specied supply equation could introduce bias in demand parameter estimates when
demand and marginal cost parameters are jointly estimated. Therefore, in our case it is preferable
to estimate the demand parameters separately from the marginal cost parameters. Villas-Boas
(2007) also recommends separately estimating demand and marginal cost parameters when the
correct specication of the supply equation is unclear.
5.1 Instruments
We recognize that a products price and its within group share (pj and Sjjg respectively) are likely
to be correlated with the residual portion of the products quality captured in j (where j is
unobserved to the researchers but observed to passengers and airlines). As such, we need to nd
instruments for pj and Sjjg in equation (16). We make the well-known identifying assumption found
in the literature on discrete choice models of demand that observed non-price product characteristics
are uncorrelated with the residual portion of product quality left in j .
18 In other words, given that
airline xed e¤ect, market origin xed e¤ects, and market destination xed e¤ects are controlled
for in the regression, then the residual shocks to product quality that are left in j are unlikely
to be correlated with observed non-price product characteristics. This allows us to use various
combinations of non-price product characteristics to form valid instruments for pj and Sjjg.
The instruments we use include: (1) itinerary distance; (2) the number of competing products
18For example, see Berry and Jia (2010) and Peters (2006) for similar identifying assumptions.
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o¤ered by other airlines with equivalent number of intermediate stops; (3) the number of competitor
products in the market; (4) the number of other products o¤ered by an airline in a market; and (5)
the sums and averages, by airlines in a market, of the "Inconvenient" and "Stops" variables.19 As
described in Gayle (2007a and 2013), instruments (1) to (4) are motivated by supply theory, which
predicts that the equilibrium price is a¤ected by changes in marginal cost and changes in product
markup. For example, itinerary distance (instrument (1)) is a marginal cost-shifting variable,
instruments (2) to (3) proxy for the degree of competition facing a product, which in turn a¤ects
the size of a products markup, and instrument (4) recognizes the fact that the more substitute
products an airline o¤ers in a market, ceteris paribus, the airline is better able to charge a higher
markup on each of these products. Last, instruments in (5) are likely to be correlated with reasons
why passengers may prefer the set of products o¤ered by one airline over the set of products o¤ered
by other airlines, and therefore serve as instruments for within group product shares.
6 Results
6.1 Demand Equation Estimates
Results from the demand estimation are reported in Table 5. Estimation A in Table 5 shows
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. OLS estimation ignores that price, within group prod-
uct share, and variables associated with the Codeshare_mkt variable are likely endogenous, and
therefore coe¢ cient estimates associated with these variables are most likely biased. In fact, an
immediate red ag is that the OLS estimate of the coe¢ cient on price is positive, which is contrary
to standard demand theory.
Estimation B and Estimation C each uses two-stage least squares (2SLS) to account for sus-
pected endogeneity. Estimation B only takes into account the suspected endogeneity of price
and within group product share, while Estimation C takes into account all suspected endogenous
variables. In Estimation C the predicted probability variable Prob(Codeshare_mkt = 1), which
is obtained from the previously estimated reduced-form logit model in Table 4, is used to replace
Codeshare_mkt in each demand equation regressor associated with this variable, while in Esti-
mation B variable Codeshare_mkt is used directly in each demand equation regressor associated
with it.
We rst evaluate the endogeneity of price and within group product share ( pj and Sjjg respec-
19See the data section for denition and explanation of the "Inconvenient" and "Stops" variables.
27
tively) by using a Hausman statistical test to compare estimates from Estimation A and Estimation
B. The endogeneity of variables associated with the Codeshare_mkt variable are then evaluated
by again using a Hausman test to compare estimates from Estimation B and Estimation C. The
Hausman test in each case conrms, at conventional levels of statistical signicance, that the vari-
ables suspected to be endogenous are indeed endogenous.20 As such, the following discussion of
results in Table 5 is based on Estimation C.
First, as expected, an air travel products price has a negative e¤ect on the utility obtained from
choosing the product, ceteris paribus. Second, the more intermediate stops an air travel product
has, the lower the utility obtained from choosing that product, ceteris paribus. The number of
intermediate stops that an air travel product has is one measure of the inherent convenience of the
travel itinerary - the negative coe¢ cient for "Stops" is consistent with our expectation.
Gayle (2007a) points out that the number of intermediate stops may only capture a portion
of the inherent convenience of an itinerary. For example, two itineraries may each have one
intermediate stop, but depending on where the intermediate stop is located in relation to origin
and destination cities, two one-stop itineraries in the same market may have very di¤erent travel
distances and travel time associated with them. As such, passengers could view these two itineraries
as having very di¤erent levels of convenience even though the itineraries have the same number of
intermediate stops. Our "Inconvenient" variable, which measures the ratio of itinerary distance
to non-stop distance between the origin and destination cities, is supposed to capture aspects of
itinerary convenience that are not picked up by number of intermediate stops.21 We therefore
expect the coe¢ cient on "Inconvenient" to be negative, which is indeed the estimated sign in Table
5.
20 In a rst stage OLS regression in which price is the dependent variable and the instruments are the regressors,
R2 is 0.115. When the dependent variable of such a regression is within group product share, R2 is 0.444. Recall
from the data section that the Pseudo R2 from the reduced-form Codeshare_mkt logit regression is 0.475, while the
correlation between Codeshare_mkt and Prob(Codeshare_mkt = 1) is 0.717. Therefore, the instruments do have
explanatory power of variations in the endogenous variables.
21The minimum value that the "Inconvenient" variable can take on is 1. As such, the further an itinerarys
"Inconvenient" measure is from 1, the less convenient is the itinerary.
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Table 5
Demand Parameter Estimates
Potential endogeneity of the Codeshare_mkt variable
not taken into account.
Potential endogeneity of the
Codeshare_mkt variable
taken into account by using
its associated fitted values
from a first-stage logit
regression.
Estimation A: Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS)
Estimation B:
Two-Stage Least Squares
(2SLS)
Estimation C:
Two-Stage Least
Squares (2SLS)
Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
Coefficient Standard
Error
Coefficient Standard
Error
Constant -3.62** 0.092 -1.41** 0.209 -1.60** 0.189
Price (in hundreds of $) 0.21** 0.011 -0.96** 0.096 -0.66** 0.097
ln (Sj|g) (σ) 0.46** 0.005 0.10** 0.013 0.12** 0.013
Stops -0.82** 0.017 -1.20** 0.030 -1.13** 0.029
Inconvenient -1.61** 0.038 -1.48** 0.051 -1.56** 0.049
Hub 0.95** 0.020 0.92** 0.034 0.85** 0.032
Virtual -0.75** 0.036 -1.28** 0.057 -1.19** 0.054
Codeshare_mkt (λ0) -0.11** 0.029 -0.05 0.037 -0.42** 0.078
DCN × Codeshare_mkt
(λ1)
0.26** 0.039 0.15** 0.051 0.26** 0.063
T   (λ2) 0.11** 0.030 0.06 0.039 0.07 0.046
T × Codeshare_mkt (λ3)
-0.02 0.035 0.02 0.046 0.01 0.06
T × DCN (λ4)
-0.05 0.047 -0.09 0.062 -0.09 0.072
T × DCN × Codeshare_mkt
(λ5)
-0.52** 0.062 -0.48** 0.081 -0.50** 0.097
T × DCN × Codeshare_mkt ×
DCN_ Pre-alli_Pass_share
(λ6)
0.99** 0.059 0.98** 0.080 1.03** 0.081
Carrier fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Market origin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Market destination fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.589 0.301 0.407
Hausman  exogeneity test
Estimation A versus Estimation B:
Hausman statistic = 943.87
Critical χ2 (0.95, 2)= 5.99
Estimation B versus
Estimation C:
Hausman statistic = 97.52
Critical χ2 (0.95, 5)= 11.07
Notes:  ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.  Models are estimated with ticketing carrier dummies,
market origin dummies and market destination dummies even though these dummy coefficients are not reported in the
table.
It has been argued that passengers are more likely to choose itineraries o¤ered by hub airlines
for the following reasons: (1) ight schedules o¤ered by hub airlines may be more convenient; and
(2) it is more likely that passengers have frequent-yer membership with an airline that has a hub
at the passengers origin airport.22 As described in the data section, a hub product means that the
origin airport on the itinerary is a hub for the airline that o¤ers the product for sale. Consistent
22See Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1995), Berry (1990), Schumann (1986).
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with our expectation, the coe¢ cient on "Hub" is positive, suggesting that passengers are more
likely to choose hub products, ceteris paribus.
As previously discussed in the data section, data on layover times and departure times, which
are also measures of itinerary convenience, are not available in the DB1B database. Therefore, we
cannot explicitly control for these aspects of itinerary convenience. However, it is reasonable to
assume that the "Hub" dummy variable picks up some of these itinerary conveniences, which also
explains the positive coe¢ cient on this variable.
Ito and Lee (2007) argue that passengers that are members of an airlines frequent-yer program
may view the airlines virtual codeshare product as an inferior substitute to its pure online product
since virtual tickets often do not allow the frequent-yer to upgrade to rst class even though the
ights on the two itineraries (pure online and virtual) are the same. This argument leads us to
expect the negative sign of the coe¢ cient on the "Virtual" dummy variable in Table 5. In other
words, the negative sign suggests that passengers perceive virtual codeshare products as inferior
substitutes to pure online products.
The estimate of  is statistically greater than zero, but its value is closer to zero than one. As
such, there is statistical (but weak economic) evidence that passengers perceive the set of products
o¤ered by an airline as closer substitutes for each other compared to the substitutability of these
products with products o¤ered by other airlines [Gayle (2007b)]. In other words, passengers
choice behavior does have some element of airline brand-loyalty associated with it, even though
this brand-loyalty does not seem to be very strong.
The estimate of 0 is negative and statistically di¤erent from zero, suggesting that demand
for non-Delta/Continental/Northwest products is persistently/systematically lower across markets
in which the three airlines eventually virtual codeshare together versus markets in which they
compete but do not virtual codeshare together. In contrast, the estimate of 1 is positive and
statistically signicant, suggesting persistently higher demand for the three airlinesproducts across
markets in which the three carriers eventually virtual codeshare together compared to markets in
which they compete but do not virtual codeshare together. 2, 3 and 4 are not statistically
di¤erent from zero, suggesting that: (1) there is no change in demand over the pre and post-
alliance periods for non-Delta/Continental/Northwest products; and (2) in the case of markets
where Delta, Continental and Northwest compete but did not virtual codeshare together, demand
did not change for products o¤ered by the three carriers over the pre and post-alliance periods.
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Interestingly, we nd that 5 < 0 and 6 > 0 at conventional levels of statistical signicance.
In addition,
56  = 0:49. Therefore, the sign pattern and actual values taken by 5 and 6
suggest that markets in which Delta, Continental and Northwest have a joint pre-alliance passenger
share greater than 0:49 and eventually virtual codeshare together during the post-alliance period,
experience an increase in demand for the three carriers products over the pre and post-alliance
periods. In other words, there is evidence of a demand-increasing e¤ect of virtual codesharing, but
this demand-increasing e¤ect is only evident in markets that the partner carriers have a substantial
joint pre-alliance passenger share. Interestingly, these are the type of markets that you would
expect a relatively larger share of consumers to hold frequent-yer membership with at least one of
the carriers prior to implementation of the alliance. Therefore, this structural demand estimation
result provides strong support for the argument that a key source of the demand-increasing e¤ect of
codesharing is via the new opportunities that consumers have to accumulate and redeem frequent-
yer points across the partner carriers.
In an appendix available upon request we explore alternate and more detailed nesting structures
for the demand model. We nd that all qualitative results discussed above are robust to these
alternate nesting structures.
Last, the demand model yields a mean own-price elasticity estimate of -1.52. Oum, Gillen and
Noble (1986), and Brander and Zhang (1990) argue that a reasonable range for own price elasticity
in the airline industry is from -1.2 to -2.0. Peters (2006) study of the airline industry produces
own-price elasticity estimates ranging from -3.2 to -3.6, while Berry and Jia (2010) nd own-price
elasticity estimates ranging from -1.89 to -2.10 in their 2006 sample. Therefore, the elasticity
estimates generated from our model are reasonable and consistent with evidence in the existing
literature.
6.2 Computed Product Markups and Marginal Costs
Table 6 reports summary statistics on price, computed product markups, and recovered marginal
cost.23 First, we see that during the post-alliance period mean price is lower in markets where
the three partner carriers virtual codeshare together relative to markets in which they compete but
23Each reported sample mean in Table 6 has an associated sample standard error, and these associated sample
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Once the sample mean is more than 2.58 times as large as the associated
sample standard error, then we can conclude that the sample mean is statistically di¤erent from zero at the 1% level
of signicance. In Table 6 we use ** to indicate that the sample mean is statistically di¤erent from zero at the 1%
level of signicance.
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do not codeshare together. Second, DL, CO and NW products have lower mean price relative to
the mean price of products o¤ered by other airlines, and this relatively lower mean price is more
pronounced in markets that the three partner carriers virtual codeshare together.
Interestingly, product markups generated from the structural model reveal a di¤erent pattern
than we see for price. In particular, even when assuming that the three partner carriers compete
with each other in markets where the three airlines virtual codeshare together, the mean markup
on their products ($157.15) is slightly higher (approximately 1 percent) relative to mean markup
on products o¤ered by other airlines ($155.19) in these markets. Therefore, the higher mean price
of products o¤ered by other airlines in these markets is likely due to cost factors, as evidenced by
recovered marginal cost in the last column of the table.
Table 6
Price, Product Markups and Recovered Product Marginal Cost (in Dollars $)
Price Product Markups Marginal
Cost
Non-codeshare
markets during
the post-
alliance period
Codeshare
markets
during the
post-alliance
period
Assumption on
price-setting
behavior of
airlines
Non-codeshare
markets during
the post-
alliance period
Codeshare
markets during
the post-
alliance period
Codeshare
markets
during the
post-alliance
period
Mean
(Std. error)
Mean
(Std. error)
Mean
(Std. error)
Mean
(Std. error)
Mean
(Std. error)
All products 225.30**
(1.342)
213.37**
(0.686)
All compete 155.64**
(0.155)
156.03**
(0.158)
57.34**
(0.681)
Products not
offered by
DL, CO or
NW
226.09**
(1.857)
215.87**
(0.956)
All compete 155.84**
(0.183)
155.19**
(0.087)
60.68**
(0.935)
DL, CO and
NW
products
224.15**
(1.882)
210.06**
(0.965)
All compete 155.34**
(0.271)
157.15**
(0.347)
52.91**
(0.982)
- - DL, CO and
NW collude in
their codeshare
markets
- 165.91**
(1.043)
44.15**
(1.403)
Notes: ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Marginal cost is recovered from each supply
model as follows: Marginal Cost = p –mkup and Marginal CostCollude = p – mkupCollude, where p is the
vector of observed product prices.
If we assume that DL, CO and NW collude in markets that they virtual codeshare together,
the comparative patterns on mean markups and mean marginal cost described above are more
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pronounced in these markets. In particular, mean markup on products o¤ered by the three
partner carriers ($165.91) is substantially higher than mean markup on products o¤ered by other
carriers ($155.19), and mean marginal cost across products o¤ered by the three carriers ($44.15)
is substantially lower than mean marginal cost across products o¤ered by other carriers ($60.68).
The table also shows that assuming the three partner carriers collude, instead of compete, in
markets that they virtual codeshare together will result in higher mean markups on their products
in these markets ($157.15 versus $165.91). This di¤erence in assumed price-setting behavior yields
a substantial di¤erence in markup on their products both in terms of dollars and percent increase
($8.76 and 5.10% respectively), and the di¤erences are statistically signicant at the 1% level.
Note we have not yet resolved which price-setting behavior between the partner carriers in their
codeshare markets is better supported by the data. All we have done so far is to summarize what
markups and marginal cost levels are under each assumed price-setting behavior. To investigate
which assumed price-setting behavior is more appropriate, we subsequently turn to a formal non-
nested statistical test for model selection. But rst we show estimation results of supply equations
under each assumed price-setting behavior.
6.3 Results from Supply Equation Estimation
Note that the markets in which price-setting behavior is in question are markets in which DL, CO
and NW virtual codeshare together during the post-alliance period. This is because the policy-
relevant issue is whether virtual codesharing together facilitates collusive price-setting behavior
between the partner carriers. As such, the remainder of the analysis focuses on this subsample of
markets. Therefore, the supply equations are estimated on this subsample of markets.
Table 7 reports parameter estimates for supply Model h and Model g respectively. Recall that
Model h assumes Delta, Continental and Northwest do not practice collusive pricing in markets
that they virtual codeshare together during the post-alliance period, while Model g assumes that
they practice collusive pricing in these markets during the post-alliance period. The markup
variables, mkup and mkupCollude, capture this assumed di¤erence in pricing behavior, and are the
only variables that di¤er across Model h and Model g. Note that coe¢ cients on these markup
variables are not estimated, but instead set equal to 1 to be consistent with theoretical derivations
of the supply equations in the model section. This coe¢ cient restriction on the markup variables
e¤ectively implies that pj   mkupj and pj   mkupColludej , which are recovered product marginal
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costs, are the dependent variables in Model h and Model g respectively. As such, the coe¢ cients
that are estimated in the supply equations are marginal cost parameters.
The coe¢ cient estimate on "Itinerary Distance" in each supply model is positive and statistically
signicant. This is evidence that marginal cost is increasing in itinerary distance, as we expect.
As previously described in the data section, both the "Carrier Presence at Origin" and "Carrier
Presence at Destination" variables are airline-specic and vary across markets for each airline.
"Carrier Presence at Origin" measures the number of di¤erent cities that an airline has non-stop
ights from going into the origin city of the market, while "Carrier Presence at Destination"
measures the number of di¤erent cities that the airline serves using non-stop ights from the
destination city of the market. These variables should be correlated with the volume of passengers
an airline channels through a market even though the endpoint cities of the market may not be
the origin or nal destination for many of the passengers. As such, we use these variables to
indirectly capture the presence of economies of passenger-tra¢ c density. Economies of passenger-
tra¢ c density means that an airlines marginal cost of transporting a passenger in a market falls as
the volume of passengers that the airline transports in the market increases [Brueckner and Spiller
(1994)].
An anonymous referee correctly points out that since the coe¢ cients on the carrier-presence
variables measure an airport-level e¤ect on a carriers prices in individual markets, perhaps these
coe¢ cients capture some blend of economies of density along with the cost of running a hub. As
such, when drawing economic inferences from the sign of these coe¢ cient estimates, it is advisable
to remember that economies of density might not be the only factor that inuences these coe¢ cient
estimates.
The coe¢ cient estimate on "Carrier Presence at Origin" is positive and statistically signi-
cant for both supply models, but the coe¢ cient estimate on "(Carrier Presence at Origin)2" is
not statistically signicant in Model h, and is positive with weak statistical signicance in Model
g. Therefore, results for the "Carrier Presence at Origin" variable are not consistent with the
presence of economies of passenger-tra¢ c density. However, the sign pattern of coe¢ cient esti-
mates on "Carrier Presence at Destination" and "(Carrier Presence at Destination)2" does suggest
the presence of economies of passenger-tra¢ c density once the airlines "presence" measure at the
destination city is su¢ ciently large. Economies of passenger-tra¢ c density has stronger statisti-
cal support in Model h compared to Model g since the negative coe¢ cient estimate on "(Carrier
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Presence at Destination)2" is statistically signicant in Model h, but not statistically signicant in
Model g. The coe¢ cient estimates on "Carrier Presence at Destination" and "(Carrier Presence
at Destination)2" in Model h suggest that an airline has to provide nonstop ight to at least 133
di¤erent cities ( 0:0082(0:00003)) from the destination city in order to achieve economies of passenger-
tra¢ c density in the relevant market. This "presence" threshold is not widely attained in the
sample given that the maximum value for the "Carrier Presence at Destination" variable is 143,
with a mean of 26. However, since economies of passenger-tra¢ c density might not be the only
factor driving these coe¢ cient estimates, then these coe¢ cient estimates might not yield a precise
"presence" threshold estimate for achieving economies of passenger-tra¢ c density.
Table 7
Supply Equation Parameter Estimates
Model h: No
collusion between
DL, CO and NW in
post-alliance period.
Model g: Collusion between
DL, CO and NW in their
codeshare markets during the
post-alliance period.
Variable (1) (2)
Constant -0.596**
(0.122)
-0.559**
(0.139)
Itinerary Distance (in 1,000 miles) 0.227**
(0.024)
0.296**
(0.035)
Carrier Presence at Origin 0.005**
(0.001)
0.003**
(0.001)
(Carrier Presence at Origin)2 2.44E-07
(0.00001)
0.000018a
(0.000011)
Carrier Presence at Destination 0.008**
(0.001)
0.006**
(0.002)
(Carrier Presence at Destination)2 -0.00003**
(8.93E-06)
-0.000019
(0.000016)
mkup 1 -
mkupCollude - 1
Carrier fixed effects Yes Yes
Market origin fixed effects Yes Yes
Market destination fixed effects Yes Yes
R2 0.373 0.295
Number of observations: 8,165
Notes:  ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. a indicates statistical significance at
the 10% level. Equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. Standard errors are in
parentheses.  The coefficients on the markup variables, mkup and mkupCollude, are not
estimated but set equal to 1 based on theoretical derivations of the supply equations in the model
section. Models are estimated with operating carrier dummies, market origin dummies and
market destination dummies even though these dummy coefficients are not reported in the table
6.4 Statistical Non-nested Tests for Model Selection
To determine which of the two alternate supply model specications provides the best statistical
t of the data, we rely on a likelihood-based non-nested statistical test in Vuong (1989).24 The
24Similar to how we use a likelihood-based non-nested test for supply model selection, Villas-Boas (2007) and Gayle
(2013) use a generalized methods of moments-based non-nested statistical test for supply model selection.
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non-nested statistical test is a modication of the well-known likelihood ratio test. The likelihood
ratio statistic for comparing Model h and Model g is given by:
LR =
nX
j=1

LLhj   LLgj

; (17)
where j index observations in the data, and n is the sample size. LLhj is the optimal value of the
log likelihood function forModel h evaluated at observation j. Specically, assuming that the error
term of the supply equation is normally distributed, LLhj = log
h


pj mkupj Wjbhbh
i
, where  () is
the standard normal probability density function, bh is the vector of marginal cost parameter esti-
mates for Model h that we report in Table 7, and bh is an estimate of the standard deviation of the
residuals fromModel h.25 LLgj is computed analogously, i.e. LL
g
j = log



pj mkupColludej  Wjbgbg

,
where bg is the vector of marginal cost parameter estimates for Model g that we report in Table 7,
and bg is an estimate of the standard deviation of the residuals from Model g.
Vuong (1989) shows that the likelihood ratio statistic in (17) can be normalized by its variance:
v2 =
1
n
nX
j=1

LLhj   LLgj
2  
24 1
n
nX
j=1

LLhj   LLgj
352 : (18)
Furthermore, the resulting non-nested test statistic:
Q = n 0:5
LR
v
; (19)
is asymptotically distributed standard normal under the null hypothesis that the two models being
compared by the test are asymptotically equivalent.26 As such, for this one-tale test at a 5% level
of signicance, Q > 1:64 implies that supply model g is statistically rejected in favor of supply
model h, Q <  1:64 implies that supply model h is statistically rejected in favor of supply model
g, while  1:64 < Q < 1:64 implies that we cannot statistically distinguish between the two models
being compared.
For the estimated supply models in Table 7, we nd that Q = 5:27, suggesting that model g is
statistically rejected in favor of supply model h. In other words, the supply model that assumes
the three carriers do not collude (Model h) in their codeshare markets during the post-alliance
period is statistically superior to the supply model that assumes the three airlines collude (Model
25Note that supply Model h and Model g are linear regression models. In the case of a linear regression model,
least squares parameter estimates and maximum likelihood parameter estimates are equivalent.
26Equations (17), (18) and (19) above correspond to equations (3.1), (4.2) and (5.6) on pages 312, 314 and 318
respectively in Vuong (1989).
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g) in these markets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to explicitly test and
statistically reject that collusive pricing behavior is associated with a codeshare alliance.
Unlike international alliance partners that often receive antitrust immunity, i.e. antitrust au-
thorities have granted some international partners the right to explicitly collude, domestic alliance
partnerships have not been granted such rights [see Brueckner and Proost (2010); Brueckner, Lee
and Singer (2011); and Brueckner (2003)]. However, even though domestic alliance partners are
forbidden to explicitly collude, it is reasonable to suspect, as policymakers did in the case of the
DL/CO/NW alliance, that the cooperation between domestic partners required to make their in-
terline service seamless, could facilitate illegal tacit collusion. So prior to the formal analysis in
this paper, tacit collusion between domestic partners could not be ruled out.
7 Conclusion
The main contribution of our present paper is to specify and estimate a structural econometric
model that allows us to disentangle demand changes from possible changes in airline pricing behav-
ior that are associated with a codeshare alliance. We focus on the Delta/Continental/Northwest
codeshare alliance, which was formed in June 2003. This alliance is particularly interesting to study
because, before ultimately allowing the alliance to go forward, the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion expressed concern that the alliance could facilitate collusion on prices and/or service levels
in the partnersoverlapping markets. In addition, previous reduced-form econometric analysis of
this alliance found evidence that virtual codesharing between Delta, Continental and Northwest
is associated with higher price [see Gayle (2008)]. Therefore, our analysis focuses on better un-
derstanding the market e¤ects, both from the demand and supply sides of the market, of virtual
codesharing between the three airlines in their overlapping markets.
Our key ndings are as follows: First, the econometric estimates for the air travel demand
equation suggest that the Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance has a demand-increasing e¤ect
associated with it. Importantly, the demand-increasing e¤ect is only evident in markets that the
partners have a substantial joint passenger share (greater than 49%) prior to implementation of
the alliance. Since a relatively larger proportion of passengers in a market are more likely to have
frequent-yer membership with at least one of the three carriers in markets that the carriers jointly
dominate prior to the alliance, this nding is consistent with the argument that these frequent-yer
passengers will increase their demand for the alliance partnersproducts given that the alliance
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creates new opportunities for passengers to accumulate and redeem frequent-yer points across
partner carriers.
Second, a statistical non-nested test applied to air travel supply model selection suggests that
Bertrand Nash pricing behavior, rather than collusive pricing behavior, between the three airlines
better t the data in markets where the three airlines codeshare together. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the rst paper to explicitly test and statistically reject that collusive pricing
behavior is associated with a codeshare alliance.
In summary, if increased collusive pricing behavior of the partner carriers is the primary concern
of policymakers with allowing the Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance to go forward, then the
evidence does not suggest implementation of the alliance facilitated collusive pricing.
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